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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V*

:

SHEILA J. SHIPLER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930164-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's
motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Has defendant failed to establish that she is

entitled to have her third degree felony conviction reduced to a
misdemeanor, where she clearly did not meet the requirements of
the statute in effect on the date she claims to have qualified
for such a reduction?
The trial court did not reach this issue.

This Court

"may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper grounds,
even though the trial court assigned another reason for its
ruling."

State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985).
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the

reduction statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2) (b) (1990), did

not authorize reduction of defendant's third degree felony
conviction to a misdemeanor because imposition of the specified
felony sentence was not stayed?
The interpretation of a statute is a conclusion of law
and is reviewed for correctness.

State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356,

360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990):
(1) If the court, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the offense of
which the defendant was found guilty and to
the history and character of the defendant,
concludes that it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that
category of offense established by statute
and to sentence the defendant to an
alternative normally applicable to that
offense, the court may, unless otherwise
specifically provided by law, enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower
category of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony,
the conviction shall be deemed to be a
misdemeanor if:
(a) The judge designates the sentence
to be for a misdemeanor and the sentence
imposed is within the limits provided by law
for a misdemeanor; or
(b) The imposition of the sentence is
stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation, whether committed to jail as a
condition of probation or not, and he is
thereafter discharged without violating his
probation.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be
construed to preclude any person from
obtaining or being granted an expungement of
his record as provided by law.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1993):
(1) If the court, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the offense of
which the defendant was found guilty and to
the history and character of the defendant,
concludes it would be unduly harsh to record
the conviction as being for that degree of
offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative
normally applicable to that offense, the
court may unless otherwise specifically
provided by law enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of
offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree
felony the conviction is considered to be for
a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge
to be for a class A
sentence imposed is
provided by law for

designates the sentence
misdemeanor and the
within the limits
a class A misdemeanor; or

(b)(i) the imposition of the sentence is
stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation, whether committed to jail as a
condition of probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently
discharged without violating his probation;
and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice
to the prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if
requested by either party or the court, finds
it is in the interest of justice that the
conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one
degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or
on the court record that the offense may be
reduced two degrees. In no case may an
offense be reduced under this section by more
than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to
preclude any person from obtaining or being
granted an expungement of his record as
provided by law.

3

Any other relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of theft as
second degree felonies and one count of theft as a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant entered a
guilty plea to one count of theft as a second degree felony on
October 22, 1990 (R. 20-21).

The remaining theft counts were

dismissed (R. 20-21) .
Prior to the imposition of sentence, defendant filed a
motion for judgment of conviction for the next lower category of
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990) (R. 29). The
trial court granted defendant's motion and imposed sentence for a
third degree felony offense on November 21, 1990, sentencing
defendant to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 30).
The trial court then suspended defendant's prison term and placed
her on a 36-month term of probation (R. 30-31, attached at
Addendum A ) .
On April 29, 1991 an amendment to section 76-3-402
became effective, which amendment precluded reduction by more
than one degree without the prosecutor's consent.

Utah Code Ann,

§ 76-3-402(3) (Supp. 1993).l
1

For convenience and because the current version of the
statute was adopted in 1991, the State references the Court
solely to Utah Code Ann. 76-3-402 (Supp. 1993).
4

Based on information from Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P) that defendant had satisfied all special conditions of her
probation, and AP&P's further recommendation that defendant's
probation be terminated as successful, the trial court terminated
defendant's probation on October 17, 1991, twenty five months
early (R. 35). Thereafter, on December 23, 1992, defendant filed
a motion to reduce her third degree felony conviction to a
misdemeanor (R. 36-37, attached at Addendum B).

The State filed

an objection and memorandum (R. 47-54, attached at Addendum C).
Following a hearing on the matter (R. 83-93, attached
at Addendum D), the trial court concluded section 76-3-402 "[did]
not authorize reducing defendant's conviction to a misdemeanor,"
and denied the motion (R. 56-7, attached at Addendum E).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to the issues raised on appeal are
adequately set forth in the Statement of the Case, supra.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant was not eligible to move the trial court to
reduce her third degree felony conviction to a misdemeanor under
the reduction statute.

The statute sets forth express

preconditions for accrual of eligibility for reduction which
defendant was not able to fulfill prior to the effective date of
the 1991 amendments.

Thus, this case is controlled by the

amended version of the statute which precludes reduction by more
than one degree without the prosecutor's consent.

As defendant

previously benefitted by a one-degree reduction at the time of
5

sentencing (from a second to a third degree felony), she is not
entitled to any further reduction under the statute without the
prosecutor's consent.
Notwithstanding the above, defendant fails to
demonstrate that she is entitled to reduction under either
version of the statute.

Under Utah law, a trial court can either

withhold sentence by staying its imposition or by staying
execution of a sentence already imposed.

The plain language of

both versions of the reduction statute requires a stay in the
imposition of the sentence, instead of a stay in the execution of
the sentence.

Here, the trial court first imposed the specified

sentence for a third degree felony, and then suspended execution
of that sentence and placed defendant on probation.

Because the

imposition of sentence was not stayed, the trial court correctly
concluded that under the plain terms of the statute, defendant
was not entitled to have her third degree felony conviction
reduced to a misdemeanor.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SHE HAS A
VESTED RIGHT TO HAVE HER THIRD DEGREE FELONY
CONVICTION REDUCED TO A MISDEMEANOR UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990)
Defendant broadly asserts that the trial court erred in
refusing to reduce her third degree felony conviction to a class
B misdemeanor.

Br. of Appellant at 11.

In so arguing, defendant

asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2) (b) (1990) controls the

6

issue as the statute in effect at the time her sentence was
imposed.

Br. of Appellant at 10 n.2.
Defendant's assertion fails to recognize the statute's

express preconditions for accrual of eligibility for reduction.
As defendant was not able to fulfill these preconditions prior to
the effective date of the 1991 amendments to the statute, she was
not eligible to move for a reduction under the 1990 version of
section 76-3-402(2) (b); consequently, she has no vested right to
reduction thereunder.
This case is controlled by the amended version of the
statute which precludes reduction by more than one degree without
the consent of the prosecutor, see section 76-3-402(3) (Supp.
1993), which was not given here (R. 47-54), see Addendum C.
Defendant previously benefitted from a one degree reduction (from
a second to a third degree felony) at the time of sentencing;
thus, she is ineligible for another reduction without the
prosecutor's consent.
A. The Amended Version of Section 76-3-402
(Supp. 1993) Applies As the Statute in Effect
at the Time Defendant's Alleged Right to
Reduction Accrued2
No person "has a vested right in any rule of law."
Berrv ex rel. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah
1985) . Further, impairment of vested rights only occurs when
2

The reasoning underlying the State's analysis was
originally and more fully set forth in the State's responsive in
State v. Ball, Court of Appeals Case No. 920786-CA, filed July
16, 1993. The Ball brief discusses the eligibility requirements
for expungement under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-2 (1990 & Supp.
1992).
7

rights have accrued to the benefit of a particular person.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988).

Defendant

relies on statutory provisions repealed prior to the date of her
motion.

Accordingly, in order to prevail she must show that she

obtained a vested right to a reduction of her conviction under
the 1990 version.

Otherwise, the amended version of section 76-

3-402 (Supp. 1993), applies as the statute in effect at the time
defendant's cause of action accrued, applies.

See Department of

Social Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982); Marshall
v. Indus. Comm'n., 704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985) (setting forth
general rule that the substantive law in effect at the time the
action is initiated applies).3
There are no cases in Utah identifying the point at
which eligibility for offense reduction vests. However, the
determination of vesting in other contexts demonstrates that
rights only accrue when fundamental conditions necessary for
maintaining an action are fulfilled.

See Gay Hill Field Serv. v.

Board of Review, 750 P.2d 606, 609-10 (Utah App. 1988) (where
controlling statute requires filing of particular document, cause
of action accrues at time condition is fulfilled); Payne v.

3

A determination of whether a party's rights have
accrued, or vested under a particular statute frequently arises
in conjunction with a claim that the statute has been
retroactively applied so as to impair the party's rights. Ibid.
However, retroactivity is not at issue here. The question before
the Court is not whether the amended statute can be applied
retroactively to defendant, but whether defendant's alleged right
to a reduction under section 76-3-402(2) (b) accrued prior to the
effective date of the 1991 amendments or, as the State believes,
after it.
8

Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1987) (all conditions for
maintenance of suit must be fulfilled before accrual of
negligence cause of action); but see Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co.
v. Sherwood Assoc. 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah App. 1990) (rights
and duties of parties to a contract become fixed at the time the
contract is entered).
In light of this principle it is frequently stated that
a right vests or accrues when the party claiming the right can
first maintain an action in court.

Payne. 743 P.2d at 189

(negligence action accrues "when the plaintiff[s] could first
have maintained [their] action to a successful result," quoting 1
Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 88 (1962)); Silver King Coalition Mines Co.
v. Indus. Comm'n.. 2 Utah 2d. 1, 268 P.2d 689, 692 (1954)
(dependent's cause of action under worker's compensation arises
at time of worker's death); Gay Hill. 750 P.2d at 609 (cause of
action "accrues at the time it becomes remediable in the
courts"); State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Fork. 99 Utah 177, 181, 100
P.2d 575, 577 (1940) (right to recover taxes arises not at the
point at which defendant should have filed its return, but at the
date of actual filing).4
Defendant has not demonstrated the necessary conditions
precedent to establishing a vested right to reduction under the
4

Upon closer examination the Gav Hill and Spanish Fork
cases are merely special applications of the general rule. In
each case the party claiming the right to bring suit was not on
notice or otherwise enabled to bring suit until the required
reports were filed or completed. Gav Hill. 750 P.2d at 610;
Spanish Fork. 100 P.2d at 577.
9

1990 version of section 76-3-402(2)(b).

Both the 1990 and

amended versions of the reduction statute require fulfillment of
specific conditions before one is eligible for reduction under
subsection (2)(b).

These conditions include: a stay in the

imposition of sentence, placement on probation, as well as the
successful completion of that probationary term.
402(2) (b) (1990 & Supp. 1993).

Section 76-3-

Additionally, the amended version

clarifies the necessity of a "motion and notice to the
prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either party
or the court," as well as a finding from the court that reduction
"is in the interest of justice."

Section 76-3-402(2) (b) (iii)

(Supp. 1993).
Even assuming defendant could demonstrate that the
imposition of her sentence was stayed for purposes of the
statute,5 the additional requirement of a violation-free
probationary term is not capable of determination until the term
expires or is terminated by the court.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-

18-1(9) (Supp. 1993) (probation may be terminated at the
discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of
set term).

It follows that defendant was not even eligible to

move the court for reduction prior to the completion of her
probationary term on October 17, 1991 (R. 35), six months after
the effective date of the 1991 amendments to the statute.
Amendment Notes,

See

section 76-3-402 (Supp. 1993).

5

The State's argument that imposition of defendant's
third degree felony sentence was not stayed within the meaning of
section 76-3-402(2) (b), is set forth in Point II of this brief.
10

The conditions for reduction in subsection (2)(b)
constitute the bases by which a defendant moving for reduction
establishes that the right to bring an action for reduction has
accrued.

In other types of actions, referenced in the cases

cited above, see Br. of Appellee at 8-10, and in defendant's
brief, see Br. of Appellant at 10 n.2,6 the determination of a
cause of action is based on "historical" facts bearing on the
relevant events.

See State v. Abevta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah

1993) (finding that the defendant had a vested right in the
substantive law governing his right to withdraw his guilty plea,
a question whose factual determinants were ascertainable from
only the events surrounding his plea).
However, an action for reduction under section 76-3402(2)(b) does not rely entirely on "historical" facts which may
or may not be subsequently determined by the court to support a
cause of action.

Rather, a motion for reduction is a

"contemporary" action in which the movant's cause of action is
not even established until he or she can demonstrate a legally
sufficient present status, i.e., one whose sentence has been
stayed and probationary term successfully completed.

Id.. Thus,

the right to reduction under subsection (2)(b) of the statute
does not even accrue until the existence of this status has been
established, for it is patent that a probationer who violates the

6

See, e.g., Harris v. Smith. 541 P.2d 343, 344 (Utah
1975) State v. Miller. 464 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1970); Belt v.
Turner. 483 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1971) (setting forth general rule
that law in effect at time of sentencing governs).
11

terms of probation will not be eligible under subsection (2)(b)
to have his or her conviction reduced.

Id..7

In essence, defendant had only a mere expectancy that
the 1990 version of section 76-3-402(2)(b) would provide relief
if her cause of action accrued before the statute was amended.
See Silver King. 268 P.2d at 692 (flIt is often said that a right
is not 'vested' unless it is something more than such a mere
expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuation of
the present laws.11); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 586 (Utah
1983) (ex post facto clause did not preclude application of newly

7

A comparison to the analogous requirements for
expungement under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-2(1) (1990 & Supp. 1993)
is helpful. See p. 8, n.2, supra. The 1990 version of the
reduction statute expressly cross-references to the expungement
statute. See Cross-References,
section 76-3-402 (1990).
Expungement, like reduction, requires the fulfillment of certain
conditions prior to maintaining an expungement petition.
In particular, the expungement statute requires a clean
record, which can only be determined as of the filing of the
petition for expungement. Section 77-18-2(1). The clean record
requirement is a condition which precedes consideration of the
expungement petition. Persons lacking a clean record are "not
eligible for expungement of any . . . offenses regardless of type
or degree of offense." Section 77-18-2(1)(b). The eligibility
determination thus denies expungement to any "person who at the
time of petition for expungement has two or more convictions . .
. tor] a previously expunged [criminal record]." Id. (emphasis
added). Accordingly, eligibility for expungement must
necessarily "be determined as of the date of the petition."
People v. McCloud. 139 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
State v. Tullv. 376 A.2d 194, 195-96 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1977)
(rejecting petitioner's claim that an irreversible right to
expungement arose at completion of minimum time requirement). In
short, a petitioner has no vested right to expungement prior to
the filing of the expungement petition. McCloud, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 323 (fixing eligibility for expungement at the time of
petition).

12

enacted resentencing statute where defendant's "expectancy" in
the former statute did not accrue into a perfected defense before
the amendment took place), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984),
overruled on other grounds. State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 427
(Utah 1986).

Because defendant's probationary term was not

successfully completed prior to the effective date of the 1991
amendments, defendant's expectation of relief never matured into
a vested right in the reduction proceedings provided for under
the 1990 version of section 76-3-402(2)(b).
Based on the foregoing, defendant's cause of action is
controlled by the amended version of the statute which was in
effect at the time her cause of action accrued.

Even assuming

defendant was otherwise eligible for reduction under subsection
(2) (b) (i-iii),8 she would still not be entitled to reduction
under subsection (3) which precludes reduction by more than one
degree without the prosecutor's consent. As defendant had
previously benefitted from a one degree reduction at the time of
sentencing, she was not entitled to another reduction without the
prosecutor's consent, which was not give here (R. 47-54), see
Addendum C.

Therefore, trial court's ruling was correct and

should be affinned.
B.

The Court May Affirm on Any Reasonable Ground

Although the prosecutor advanced this argument below
(R. 84-91), see Addendum D, the trial court denied defendant's
motion for another reason (R. 56-57) , see Addendum E, to be
8

See n.5, supra.
13

discussed in Point II of this brief.

The Court may affirm the

trial court's decision on either ground.

See State v. Bryan. 709

P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) (appellate court may affirm lower
court's decision on any proper ground, even if lower court
assigned another reason for its ruling).
POINT II
THE IMPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S THIRD DEGREE
FELONY SENTENCE WAS NOT STAYED FOR PURPOSES
OF EITHER VERSION OF THE REDUCTION STATUTE;
THUS, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE HER
CONVICTION REDUCED TO A MISDEMEANOR
Defendant has not demonstrated that the imposition of
her third degree felony sentence was stayed; consequently,
defendant fails to demonstrate that she is entitled to have her
third degree felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor under
either version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990 & Supp.
1993) .
A.

Imposition of Sentence Below

In denying defendant's motion to reduce her third
degree felony conviction to a misdemeanor, the trial court found:
1. That on October 22, 1990, the defendant
entered a plea of "guilty" to the charge of
Theft, a second degree felony;
2. That on November 19, 1990, the defendant
was sentenced as a third-degree felony,
pursuant to the provisions of § 76-3-402(1),
Utah Code Ann. (1990), to serve, inter alia,
the statutory term of zero-to-five years
incarceration at the Utah State Prison;

14

3. That on November 19, 1990, the Court
suspended the imposition of sentence9 and
placed the defendant on probation; and
4. That on October 17, 1991, the Court
terminated the defendant's probation as
successful without violation.
(R. 56-7), see Addendum E.
trial court concluded:

Based on the foregoing findings, the

"[section] 76-3-402(2)(b), Utah Code Ann.

(1990), does not authorize reducing defendant's conviction to a
misdemeanor because the imposed sentence was executed10 by the
Court" (R. 57), see Addendum E. While the trial court's ruling
could have been articulated more precisely, it is a correct
interpretation of the statute and should be affirmed.

9

Considering the trial court's findings and conclusions
as a whole, the trial court's use of the phrase "suspended the
imposition
of sentence" in finding number three is a misstatement. It is undisputed in the record that the court imposed
the sentence specified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (1990),
e.g. a term of zero to five years (R. 30), see Addendum A. See
also nn. 12-13, infra. Indeed, in the preceding finding number
two, the court expressly recognized its imposition of the
specified term of years. Thus, the court suspended the execution
of sentence, rather than the imposition
of sentence. This
construction of the court's findings is also consistent with the
court's ultimate determination that defendant was not entitled to
have her third degree felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor
precisely because sentence had been "imposed" (R. 57), see
Addendum D.
10

The court's conclusion that it "executed" defendant's
sentence is another apparent mis-statement and is also extraneous
to the court's preceding, and more critical, determination that
the specified felony sentence had been "imposed" (R. 57), see
Addendum E. Construing the court's ruling in conjunction with
the record, it is clear the court actually "suspended" the
execution of the imposed felony sentence and then placed
defendant on probation (R. 30-31), see Addendum A.
IS

B. Distinguishing the Imposition of Sentence
From the Execution of Sentence For Purposes
of the Reduction Statute
Under either version of the reduction statute, a felony
conviction may be considered to be for a misdemeanor if "the
imposition

of the sentence

on probation!.]"

is

stayed

and the defendant is placed

Section 76-3-402 (2) (b) (1990 & Supp. 1993)

(emphasis added)-11

In the instant case, the trial court did

not stay the imposition of defendant's third degree felony
sentence for purposes of section 76-3-402(2) (b) (i) (Supp. 1993).
Rather, the trial court imposed an indeterminate term of zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 30), see Addendum A, as
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (1990).12

The court

11

The 1991 amendments clarified that only a felony of the
third degree was capable of reduction under subsection (2)(b),
and that it could only be reduced to a class A misdemeanor.
While subsection designations were also added in
subsection 2(b), the operative language requiring a stay in the
imposition of sentence, is the same in both the 1990 and amended
versions of the statute.
For reasons set forth in Point I, supra. the State's
analysis proceeds under the amended version of the statute.
12

Section 76-3-203(3) provides:
A person who has been convicted of a felony
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as follows:
(3) In the case of a felony of the third
degree, for a term not to exceed five years
16

then suspended execution of that sentence and placed defendant on
probation (R. 30-31), see Addendum A.13
The distinction between a stay in the imposition

of a

sentence and a stay in the execution of a sentence is real,

A

trial court can withhold sentence either by staying its
imposition or by staying execution of a sentence already imposed.
Compare State v. Garnick. 619 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1980)
(execution of defendant's one year jail sentence suspended and
defendant placed on probation; thereafter, defendant's probation
was revoked and the original jail sentence ordered executed) with
State v. Janis, 597 P.2d 873-74 (Utah 1979) (imposition of
sentence continued until time of probation revocation; following
which revocation "the judge imposed sentence of 0-5 years in the
Utah State Prison").

13

While it is true that probation can also be a sentence,
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c) (Supp. 1993), section 76-3402(2)(b)(i) only makes sense when the term "sentence" as used
therein is construed to mean the "sentence" specified for a third
degree felony, i.e., a term of years. See section 76-3-203(3).
To construe the subsection otherwise is to defeat its purpose.
See RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n., 741 P.2d 948, 951
(Utah 1987) ("a proper construction of the statute must further
its purposes"); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.. 749
P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.) (same), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988). See also Sutherland's
Stat.
Constr.
§ 4607 at 127
(5th Ed.) (". . . words or clauses may be . . . restricted to
harmonize with other provisions of an act. The particular
inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or what
they may comprehend, but in what sense were they intended to be
understood or what understanding they convey when used in the
particular act."). The only logical construction of subsection
(2)(b)(i) is that the legislature intended to afford those
defendants deemed acceptable for a probationary term (in lieu of
imposition of sentence), and who also successfully completed that
probationary term, an opportunity to have their third degree
felony convictions reduced to class A misdemeanors.
17

The trial court's well recognized sentencing discretion
is reflected in the probation statute, which reads in part:
On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill,
no contest, or conviction of any crime or
offense, the court may suspend the
imposition
or execution
of sentence and place defendant
on probation . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (3) (a) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
Another provision provides that " [i]f probation is revoked, the
defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed
shall be executed."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (e) (iii) (Supp.

1993) ,14
Moreover, the provision that preceded Utah's current
probation statute provided that:
Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any
crime or offense, if it appears compatible
with the public interest, the court having
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition
or
the execution
of sentence
and may place the
14

The legislature has distinguished between the
imposition
and the execution
of sentence in other provisions of
the code, though it has not defined either term. See, e.g.. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-406(1)(1990) ("probation shall not be granted,
the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, .
. . for any person who commits a felony of the first degree . .
. " ) ; Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1(6) (Supp. 1993) ("The court may
suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required
under this section . . . " ) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1) (Supp.
1993) ("In a case involving rape of a child, aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, or sodomy upon a child, the court may impose an
indeterminate term for a first degree felony, or execution of
sentence may be suspended and probation may be considered . .
. " ) ; section 76-5-406.5(5) ("If the court finds a defendant
granted probation under this section fails to cooperate or
succeed in treatment or violates probation . . . the mandatory
minimum sentence previously imposed for the offense shall be
immediately executed."); section 76-5-406.5(6) ("A court may not
modify the mandatory minimum sentence to an indeterminate term of
five years to life and then suspend execution of that sentence
and impose probation.").

18

defendant on probation for such period of
time as the court shall determine.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953) (emphasis added).

In construing

this predecessor statute, the Utah Supreme Court said that "[t]he
clear meaning of the words of the statute give the court the
power to withhold sentence until such time as the court
determines whether or not the prisoner is capable of
rehabilitation and that this may be done upon his plea of
guilty."

State v. Fedder. 262 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1953).

See

also Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640# 641-43 (Utah 1944)
(imposition of sentence suspended and defendant placed on
probation on the condition that he "straighten out" or "come in
and be sent to the penitentiary.").
This sentencing discretion facilitates the trial
court's "flexibility to deal with exceptional cases and evolving
Utah Ct. R. Ann. (1993), Appendix

public sentiment."
Sentence

and Release

Guidelines

at p. 1129.

D: Utah

Specifically, it

affords trial courts the opportunity to relieve less culpable
defendants of the stigma associated with the imposition of a
felony sentence.

See e.g.. Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d at 642-

43 (Utah Supreme Court observed that in staying the imposition of
sentence the trial court was "endeavoring to save the youths from
the stigma of prison.

. . . It was dealing with juveniles; boys

the court hoped to keep out of the penitentiary; doubtful cases,
but worthy of care and consideration in the opinion of the trial
judge.").

A defendant whom the trial court does not consider to

merit the imposition of the specified third degree felony
19

sentence, see subsection (2)(b)(i), may, upon the successful
completion of probation, see subsection (2) (b) (ii) , and upon a
finding that it is in the interest of justice, see subsection
(2)(b)(iii), avoid having the original felony conviction recorded
in his/her criminal history.

In essence, a defendant qualifying

for reduction under subsection (2)(b) benefits from a
simultaneous expungement of the prior felony conviction.
the legislature's use of the term imposition

Thus,

over the term

execution in subsection (2)(b) represents more than a semantical
choice.

It is an express recognition of the trial court's broad

sentencing discretion, in the "exceptional case," to spare a less
culpable defendant the stigma of a third degree felony sentence.
C. The Plain Language of the Reduction
Statute Precludes Reduction Under the Facts
of This Case
The plain language of section 76-3-402(2)(b)(i)
requires a stay in the imposition of the sentence, instead of a
stay in the execution of the sentence.

See Cox Rock Prod, v.

Walker Pipeline Constr.. 754 P.2d 672, 675-76 (Utah App. 1988)
("'We will interpret and apply [a] statute according to its
literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or
inoperable.") (citation omitted).

See also Mountain States Tel.

& Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184,
185 (Utah 1945) (statutory interpretation "must be based on the
language used, . . . and the court has no power to rewrite a
statute to make it conform to an intention not expressed").
defendant is not able to demonstrate that imposition of her

30

As

sentence was stayed, she is not entitled to relief under the
plain terms of the statute.
Defendant at no time argued below that hers was an
"exceptional case," meriting a stay in the imposition of the
specified third degree felony sentence and immediate placement on
probation as required under subsection (2)(b).

Rather, at the

time of sentencing, defendant moved to have her original second
degree felony conviction reduced to a third degree felony under
section 76-3-402(1) (1990) (R. 29). The trial court granted that
motion and imposed the specified third degree felony sentence (R.
30-31) , see Addendum A.

The court then suspended execution of

that sentence and placed defendant on probation.

Id..

Because sentence was imposed on defendant, it is
irrelevant that she ultimately, successfully completed her
probationary term.

See section 76-3-402(2) (b) (ii).

Upon the

imposition of the specified felony sentence, defendant's
opportunity for further reduction was foreclosed.15

As set

forth in Part B, supra, subsection (2)(b)(i) recognizes the well
established discretion of the trial court in "exceptional cases"
to dispense with the imposition of the specified felony sentence

15

Additionally, as set forth in Point I (A) , supra, the
amended statute clarifies that defendant, as one having
previously benefitted by a one degree reduction at the time of
sentencing (R. 30), see Addendum A, was precluded from having her
conviction further reduced without the consent of the prosecutor,
see section 76-3-402(3), which was not given in this case (R. 4754), see Addendum C. Thus, even if defendant could demonstrate
that the imposition of her sentence was stayed under subsection
(2)(b)(i), she would still be ineligible for reduction under
subsection (3) because the prosecutor declined to consent.
21

and instead set the terms of a probationary period.

As such,

subsection (2)(b)(i) represents more than a semantical
distinction, it is based on sound policy.

Accordingly, the trial

court correctly determined defendant was not entitled to further
reduction under the plain terms of the statute and this Court
should affirm that ruling.
D. State v. Bagshaw Offers No Guidance to
the Court
Defendant argues that her case is factually
indistinguishable from State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1386
(Utah App. 1991), wherein this Court determined Bagshaw was
entitled to have her two third degree felony convictions reduced
to class B misdemeanors under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2) (b)
(1990).

As in this case, the trial court imposed the sentence

specified for third degree felonies, an indeterminate term of
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for each of the two
counts.

Id. at 1384. The court then suspended those sentences

and placed Bagshaw on probation.

Id..

The similarity between

this case and Bagshaw ends here.
At issue in Bagshaw was the trial court's
interpretation of "misdemeanor" and whether Bagshaw was entitled
to have her convictions reduced to class A misdemeanors as the
trial court had done, or further reduced to class B misdemeanors
as defendant and the State initially agreed was required under

22

the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-104(2)16 and the
1990 version of section 76-3-402(2) (b).
1385-86.

Bagshaw, 836 P.2d at

The State agrees with the Court's disposition of

Baashaw and its interpretation of the applicable statues insofar
as section 76-3-104(2) controlled the definition of the term
"misdemeanor" in section 76-3-402(2) (b).

However, Baashaw did

not address, or even recognize the distinction at issue here,
between a stay in the imposition of sentence and a stay in the
execution of sentence.

Therefore, Baashaw offers no guidance to

the Court in its resolution of this issue.17
Defendant's reliance on Baashaw does not comport with a
reasoned interpretation of the reduction statute and should be
rejected.

The language of the amended statute is identical to

that of the previous provision erroneously applied in Baashaw;
thus, it is important that this issue be clarified to prevent
further confusion or misapplication of the statute by trial
courts.

16

Section 76-3-104(2) provides:
An offense designated a misdemeanor, either
in this code or in another law, without
specification as to punishment or category,
is a class B misdemeanor.

17

Neither of the parties specifically addressed this
issue prior to the issuance of the Baashaw opinion. For the
first time in a petition for rehearing, the State recognized that
the distinction between a stay in the imposition of sentence and
a stay in the execution of sentence presented a more fundamental
question concerning Bagshaw's eligibility for reduction under the
statute, which question should have controlled the outcome in
that case. The Court denied the State's petition.
23

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's ruling
denying defendant's motion to reduce her third degree felony
conviction to a misdemeanor should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 3 2

day of August, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
^IAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

JUB6EWERT |
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

f
I
>
C
1
J

vs.
SHIPLERj SHEILA J .

DOB:

7/28/64
Defendant

p
0

Case No.
omomsQQ TS
Count No. -E22
Honorable KENNETH RTGTRTTP
Constance George
Clerk
Reporter _ Carlton Way
Stan Jacobson
Bailiff
November
19, 1990
Date

• The motion of R.Scowcrafetonter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by a a jury; a the court; • plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
Theft
, a felony
of the -2nd. degree, O a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented Hyp. Rnwynf«- , and the State being represented h y T vvyY
is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life; &> \ > 0 \ d<Q> I
fig' m not to exceed five years; (Suspended).
r*r\
o*acr
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
\ r d o i O * ^ 3 5 ^
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
^,^
m ^^ ^
$60
f ^ » and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ _ L ^ 2 £ ^ °
° - **J ™* ° « thru Comm/Ser at $5.1
u-0 • 0 and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
T» to p*e»™** **T P Hfrrlng
M$'*

D
D
•
D
fffc m

D e f t t o pav $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 Victim

TtaatltiiMrwi

A.QPQC 7 P P .

ft $ 3 0 0 . 0 0 B > ^ i p i n O T »

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with ^mammm^^mm^mmll^mil^^
upon motion of • State, O Defense, O Court, Count(s)
* &3

VPP

*n LDA

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of 36
ffpnfrhg
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County O for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment
D Commitment shall issue
. .
DATED this —^lsftay of Novemfer/ VLQ90

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^ DISTRICT^Ur^ JUDGE
KENNETH RIGTRUP

Defense Counsel
Page _1

Deputy County Attorney
».«..—*—e»*ta%

^ 2
of

00030

Judgment/State v.

901901599 FS
,CR
^Honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP

SHIPLER, SHEILA J.

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
9 Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept of Adult Probation & Parole.
D Serve
In the Salt Lake County Jail commencing
____
Pay a fine in the amount of $1000*1 at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation
and ^
Probation
and
£**£
Parole; or D at the rate of ($600-00 may be worked off at the rate SglOO Hr.^orCMnai
Pay restitution in the amount of $.
nt to be determined by the Department
nentdt Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of.
; or D at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, (reserved for hearing)
C Enter, participate in, and complete any ttentfll Healthy,
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, i ^ ^ * ^ h*L*ti*Z+
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
.
O Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or O vocational training O as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with
. training D as directed by the Department of Adult
O Participate in and complete any
Probation and Parole; or D with
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
O Submit to drug testing.
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
O Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
O Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
O Submit to testing for alcohol use.
O Take antabuse O as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
O Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
• Maintain full-time employment.
O Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
a Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
a Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
under the Interstate Compact as approved
o Defendant's probation may be transferred to
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
O Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
O Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
ffe <L Defendant is to commit no crimes.
. for a review of this sentence.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on.

ipgg

ft-

M'

[tffM
j^y •

Ttefgndimfr » n p a y
TU>fPTiriaT>» » o p a y

$ 7 0 0 . 0 0 PpmupPTnPT^f V P P tn
$ 7 5 0 OO V - f r M m F » « M f r i i M r * n

DATED this

Page.

of.

T.TU
Accpce^f

V*«

day of
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
KENNETH RIGTRUP
f\ r\ r\ o *

ADDENDUM B

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (#5141)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

•A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

Plaintiff,
v.

MOTION JllTD ORDER TO
REDUCE CONVICTION TO
MISDEMEANOR

:

SHEILA J. SHIPLER,

:
:

Case No. 901901599FS
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

Defendant.
The defendant, SHEILA J. SHIPLER, alleges:
1. That on September 4, 1990, the defendant was
charged by Information in the above-numbered case;
2.

That on October 22, 1990, the defendant pleaded

guilty to the charge of Theft, a second-degree felony;
3. That on November 19, 1990, the defendant was
sentenced by this Court as a third-degree felony and placed on
probation; and
4.

That on October 17, 1991, the defendant's

probation was successfully terminated by this Court without
violation.

00036

WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully moves this Court
to reduce the conviction previously entered to a class B
misdemeanor pursuant to the provisions of §§76*3-104(2) and
76-3-402(2)(b) Utah Code Ann. (1990).

DATED this

day of December, 1992.

ROGER K.^SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this *^s ^dav of December, 1992.
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ADDENDUM C

Tfti: uJuc.ua! District

DAVID E.YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ERNIE JONES, Bar No. 1736
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

FEB 0 8 1993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE
DEGREE OF OFFENSE

-vsCase No. 901901599FS
SHEILA J. SHIPLER,
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup
Defendant.

FACTS
1.

The defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty on

October 22, 1990, of the offense of Theft, a second degree
felony.
2.

On November 19, 1990, the defendant was sentenced by

this Court.

At that hearing, the Court granted the defendant's

motion to enter conviction for the next lower category of offense
and imposed upon the defendant a term in the Utah State Prison
not to exceed five years, as provided for the offense of Theft, a
third degree felony.

nnnjio

3.

The Court then suspended the execution of the imposed

sentence and placed the defendant on probation upon various terms
and conditions.
4.

It appears that the defendant has been discharged from

probation without having violated her probation.

ISSUE ONE:
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 76-3-402 (2) HAVE NOT BEEN MET
BY THIS DEFENDANT TO QUALIFY HER FOR REDUCTION OF CONVICTION
Section 76-3-402 (2) (b) provides, that the conviction is
considered or deemed to be a misdemeanor if "[t]he imposition of
sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on probation . . .
and he is thereafter discharged without violating her probation.11
It is submitted that the staying of the

ff

imposition of

sentence" is a term of art and is not synonymous with the staying
of the execution

of sentence; that

it requires

a specific,

deliberate act by the judge at the time of sentencing before this
portion of the statute can be invoked.
Section 77-18-1

(2) UCA provides that,

w

[o]n a plea of

guilty, • . •, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court
may suspend the imposition OR execution of sentence and place the
defendant on probation." [emphasis added]

It is submitted that

the legislature recognizes that there is a distinction between

suspending the imposition

and suspending the execution of a

sentence.
The case of WiUimns vy fiarrJP, 149 P.2d 640, (Utah, 1944),
dealt with

circumstances where the

court,

after

conviction,

suspended the imposition of sentence until a later date and
placed the defendant in the custody of a Mr. Chi Ids.

On that

first date the court again suspended the imposition of sentence
to another and then another and then another date.

Before the

last date, the defendant had been convicted of a new criminal
offense.

After what the appellate court determined was an

appropriate hearing, the defendant admitted the violation and the
court sentenced the defendant to a prison term.

It was only at

that last hearing, after the violation, that the Court stated
what the term of incarceration for the defendant was to be.

In

holding that the court had acted properly, the Supreme Court
stated,
"The right to suspend imposition of sentence and
the right to place one on probation is a discretionary
right.
One placed upon probation has a right to be
heard as to whether he has violated the conditions upon
which suspended sentence was based, [citations omitted]
Upon such a hearing, the trial court has discretionary
power to continue probation or impose sentence, but to
authorize termination of probation there must be some
competent evidence of violation of the terms of
probation. Violation of the terms and conditions of
suspension o[f] probation is usually a ground for
revocation and the imposition of sentence.11 at 642.
In another case, State v. Fedder, 262 P.2d 753 755 (Utah
1953), the Utah Supreme Court quoted the then relevant statute

nnnKft

(77-35-7, UCA 1953), with the following emphasis, "'Upon a
of

guilty

or conviction of any crime or offense, if it appears

compatible

with

the

public

jurisdiction may suspend
sentence

the

the

interest,

imposition

court

having

or the execution of

and may place the defendant on probation for such period

of time as the court shall determine.'
words

plea

The clear meaning of the

of the statute give the court the power to withhold

sentence until such time as the court determines whether or not
the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation and that this may be
done upon her plea of guilty." [underline is my emphasis, italics
are original emphasis]
It is submitted that this case clearly shows that there is a
difference between suspending the imposition and execution of a
sentence.
The case of State v. Janis. 597 P. 2d 873
involved

a

defendant

who,

after

conviction,

(Utah, 1979)
was

given

a

sentencing date and two 90-day evaluations which were completed.
At the sentencing date held after the last 90-day evaluation,
91

imposition of sentence was continued to October 18, 1976, and

appellant was placed on probation.99 at 873.

Subsequently, the

defendant violated the terms of probation and an order to show
cause why her probation should not be revoked was set.

At that

order to show cause, the defendant9s probations was revoked and
"the judge imposed a sentence of 0-5 years in the Utah State

Prison."

at 874.

In affirming the authority of the court to so

sentence, the Supreme Court cited the then relevant sentencing
authority of 77-35-7, UCA and Williams v. Harris.

supra.

In State v. Garnick. 619 P.2d 1383 (Utah, 1980), the Supreme
Court dealt with

a case where the facts included that the

defendant plead guilty to a class A misdemeanor

and,

w

[o]n

November 28, 1978, defendant was sentenced to be confined to the
Utah County Jail for a period of one year.

Execution of the

sentence was suspended and the was placed on probation . . ."at
1384.
It is submitted that the import of all these cases is that
there is a difference between the suspension of the imposition
and the suspension of the execution of a sentence.

It is

submitted that when a sentence is imposed when the term of
imprisonment

or

incarceration

is set.

If no such term of

imprisonment or incarceration is stated, then the imposition of a
sentence is stayed.

If the term of imprisonment is set, then the

court can only suspend the execution of the imposed sentence.
It is submitted that for Subsection (2) (b) to apply, the
sentencing Court must have sentenced a defendant in a specific
way.

That specific way must have been that the imposition of

sentence was stayed.

That

is, no term

of

imprisonment

or

incarceration must have been established as the punishment for
the offense

for which the defendant was sentenced.

It is

nnnsr*

submitted
sentencing

that because this court did not,
of

defendant

on

January

7,

in the

1990,

original

suspend

the

imposition but rather suspended or stayed the execution of the
imposed sentence of not less than one nor more than fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison, the requirements of 76-3-402 (2) (b)
have not been met and the defendant is not entitled to any
reduction of the previously imposed judgment of conviction.
CQNCfrUSJON
It is submitted that defendant's Motion to Reduce Conviction
should not be granted because the defendant is not entitled to
such reduction, the requirements of Section 76-3-402

(2) (b)

having not been met because the sentencing Court did not suspend
the imposition of sentence.
DATED this 12th day of February, 1992.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

ERNIE JONES
Deputy County Attorney

hereby

certify that

*rue and

correct

copy

o

he

foregoing Objection To Defendant's Motion To Reduce Degree
Offense and Memorandum

Opposition

Defendant's Motion wu

Reduce Degree o1 Offense was delivered to Roger K. Scowcroft,
Attorney for Defendant Sheila J. Shipler,

424 East 500 South,
the ___

day

February, 1992.
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ADDENDUM

i

I

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 901901599

-vsSHEILA o.

SENTENCING,

SHIPLER,

-19-90

Defendant.

8

10
IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th d

11
12

November, 1990,

13

on fo

2:30 o'clock p.m
«

re the HONORA

cause came
KENNETH

14| RIGTRUP, District Court, without a jury in the Salt

]

nouse, Sa.

16|
A P P E A R A N C E S :
18

For the State:

TOM VUYK
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney at Law

1
20|

FILED BISTWCT COURT
Third Judicial District

9
4

22
23
24
25

APR 13 693
CAT b y :

CARLTON

\Y,

CSR,

RBAti
•

«_A«.

* •-*•* *rwm 'imafi

TbpUtyOmkY

r r-r

1 COURT OF APPEALS
n n A n *1

I

1

y-y-ty-g-B-B-p-ir-ir-g-s

21
3

THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Sheila

J. Shipler; File CR90-1599.

41

The Court understands that you were

5| originally charged with one count of Theft, a third
61 degree felony; and two counts of Theft, second degree
7

felonies; and pled guilty to one count of Theft, a

81 second degree felony; is that true?
91

THE DEFENDANT:

10

THE COURT:

Yes.

Thereafter, the matter was

111 referred to Adult Probation and Parole Department for
12

a pre-sentence report.

13

The Court has received such a report.

14

Have you had an opportunity,

15

Mr. Scowcroft, to review that?

16

MR. SCOWCROFT:

17

THE COURT:

18

Have you had an adequate

opportunity to review that with your client?

19

MR. SCOWCROFT:

201

THE COURT:

21
22

I have, your Honor.

Yes.

You may address the issue of

sentencing.
MR. SCOWCROFT:

Thank you, your Honor.

23

First of all, it's nice to get a report that puts

24

someone in the Excellent category, recommends no

2 51

incarceration.
2

other hand, it's disturbing to me
to see someone without

criminal record burdened with
•n very difficult c*i

4

Sheila.

She has pleaded guilty to a second degree

5
6

an amount close

$5,000.

7

op J n I n n

8

were three charges filed, as it was based on three

9

months

n | I i'

That's, in essence, in my

I HI i 11 I

I lii ii ,,i MI ii I 111 i i» -- th

merely say that I -- a

10

second degree felony, of course, is the highest level

11

of theft there is.

12

that, as I said, in essence,

And for her to plead guilty on
a plea as charged.

13

We have submittec

14

76-304-2 for the Court to consider sentencing

15

lesser level of offense.

16

motion pursuan

As you know, there's a number c

_. _

ways

17

that the Court can proceed on that.

18

that right now.

19

probation and entertain our motion *"> reduce this to a

20

misdemeanor status after probation.

The Court could allow her to complete

T u

21

know

doubt that she will fulfill

22

probation without trouble.

23

sizable.

The restitution here is

And I will address that issue next.

24
25

The Court can do

We'd ask the Court
into account.

take those matters

Because she has no criminal record, I

1

feel she is someone who is deserving of that kind of

21 consideration by the Court.
31

In terms of restitution, your Honor, I

4

talked to Jerry Turner in this case.

He's the victim

5

in this case.

6

amounts for the checks that were written, of 47, 36,

7

76 and $539.77 per payroll; and then two amounts for

They've asked for four amounts here,

81 auditing costs of theirs.
91
10

In terms of the checks, your Honor,
already one check for $500 has been deducted from that

111 amount.

The original allegation here was $5,236.76.

12

They've taken one of those checks out that she wrote

13

to herself, a five-hundred dollar check, that —

14

was, indeed, authorized.

15

Mr. Turner's attention.

16

amount that they've requested here in terms of the

which

And I brought that to
So the 47, 36 is the full

171 checks that Miss Shipler wrote to herself.
18

She has stated here, your Honor, that --

191 her story has been that she was party to these acts
2Oi that she didn't know were criminal because one of the
21

owners of the business authorized her to do it and

221 told her to do it.

And that —

she told that to the

231 presentence investigator right here in the report.
24

That's in the report.

He, Mr. Mercer, does address

251 that issue.
|
1

4

imivyfi

I'm not here

1
2

I ll H I

.

h lit'

""

arguing, and

I

I

3

back

4

run

5

that was a check written

6

your Honor, was payroll «*..»,-....

7

on confusion on her hourly rate of pay.

Hi Minrr

H

t

But the Court should know that

rhrrl'i

I h r y nrlinUtpfl

least

win nnthnr rrrlj

by herself.

$539.75,

8
9

this

them, that

suppose the

victim's positioi
position means most here,

11

alleged that these were simply -- that this amount,

12

the 500

13

pay; whether it was six dollars, six, 50 or seven,

14

25.

7 was the result of confusion on hourly

15

They've also asked for restitution *.i
1

an

16

the amount of

17

for auditing costs, they say, to investigate these

18

crimes.

19

indeed based on this event or whether those were just

20

normal business expenses

21

take that into account and possibly not assessing her

22

those costs.

T

50 for bank research, and $1,354

'- -"- certain whether those costs were

*-J' I'd ask the Court

>

23

The -- she is working now.

24

five dollars an hour, brings home about $150 every two

25

week e ,

I li i. ' L HI a i i J. u J .

iuJ

jn

L I 4 li l

yuu 1

u J. L! LI I I \

nnn77

1

from her first marriage.

And the Court, I guess, has

2

read the letters included in the presentence report

31 from her mother and from her ex-husband.
4|

I'm sure you understand, your Honor, how

51 hard this is on her*

And I don't mean to minimize how

61 hard it is on the other people, the victims who lost
7

their money.

And that's obviously true.

81 very hard on her.
9
10

But it is

She's put her life on hold in this

matter, and it's caused her a lot of pain and
suffering to go through this.

Ill

My recommendations for sentencing, your

12

Honor —

I'm pleased with the presentence report.

13

It's a good report.

14

incarcerated because I'm confident that she can

15

perform adequately under probation.

I don't think she ought to be

16

I'd ask the Court to consider waiving

17

the fine in this case for community service because

18

her income is limited.

19

to perform some community service in lieu of that

20

fine.

21

And I think she might be able

She will pay the money back in full, and

22

I assume AP&P or any supervising authority would

23

arrange for that.

24

our motion to reduce this conviction under 76-340-2.

25

We've submitted a motion.

We would ask the Court to consider

I think if a person who has
6
^v +% 4*K «•• ^Tk

1
2

amends for

interest

burdening

3
4

Is there anything you want to say ' ~ the

5
6

THE DEFENDANT:
I I

7
8

I! I .• 3 "1 1 .1

1 said what * sould say
I .1" I

o

happen, that I even have to be here before yoi

And I would like to get

Bull I

10

11 right.

11

My lit!

12

home life like he had.

13

:i s to make him and everyone around TO* know that I ' • i

14

definitely not a troublemaker.

u

i

c e r n 0 w

with my life.

J ! • 3 t ,5 •BeC| c , ,Bt , ; ,. in ,

And that's

that's my goals,

I have no desire to

151 cause any trouble for anyone.
16

THE COURT:

17

MR. VUYK:

Mr. Vuyk.
We ask that you follow the

18

presentence report.

19

agreed *-~ ~ reduction, and we would oppose it.

20

Mr. Jones has not stipulated nor

THE COURT:

You did indicate -- ~. at

21

least the presentence report indicates -- «•»*-* your

22

husband was aware of your

involvement*

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

Excuse me?

The presentence report at

251 one point indicates that your husband was aware

I

7

"

1

your involvement at the time it was taking place?

2

THE DEPENDANT:

I believe Mr. Mercer

3

just -- he spoke with me and asked me how my

4

relationship is now.

I just recently got married.

51 And he said -- he says he has stood by me through all
61 this.

My understanding from reading that is that he

71 knows the proceedings.
81 through.
9
10

Be knows what we are going

He was aware of many things that, you know,

went on at the place that I was employed at.

And as I

said before, it would take a long time to really tell

111 you everything that went on on both sides.

However,

12

my husband is aware of everything that is going on as

13

far as, you know, court dates, so forth, so on,

14

everything.

15

THE COURT:

Is there any legal reason

16

why the Court ought not to impose sentence at this

17

time?

18
19
20

MR. SCOWCROFT:

I know of none, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

The motion to reduce one

21

step may be granted.

The Court will sentence as a

22

third degree felony.

You will be sentenced to serve

23

zero to five years in the Utah State Penitentiary.

24

The Court will suspend that, place you on 36 months of

25

probation on the following terms and conditions:
8

That

1

,

thousand dollar fine, two' hundred and fifty

21
3

off $600

five dollars per hour through community

4|
51

The Court will reserve the issue of

71 would want some firm evidence on that.
8

c oi" fJ! il ::: t il r ig statemer

9

I ought to see in ~ greater scrutiny*

10

And the

about the rate of payf I think,

expect you to contact the Court in

111 a reasonable period c* time and make arrangements fu*.
12

a hearing on that after you've had a chance ^~ do any

13

discovery you want.

14

MR. SCOWCROFT:

15

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

You are to abide by the
You are x~ commit no

16

usual conditions of probation.

17

crimes.

18

the Legal Defenders Association

19

full-time employment.

20

cards or checking accounts while on probation.

21

you are to undergo any mental health ev

You are to pay a recoupment fee of $200
You're to maintain

*va a

t

221 and/or treatments as directed from time
23

And

time by

Adult Probation and Parole Department.

24

1) o i c>i :i understand those conditions?

25

T H EDEFENDAN1

L_

'
" • i,

., I .

00081

lj

MR. SCOWCROFT:

21

THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

So if you'll follow through

31 on the restitution?
41

MR. SCOWCROFT:

51

THE COURT:

I will, your Honor.

And advise the clerk that

61 we'll need probably two hours.
7

Make sure that the

prosecutor has lead tine to get the victims lined up

81 We'll have a brief hearing on it
91
10
Ill

MR. SCOWCROFT:

Thank you very much,

your Honor.
(Hearing adjourned.)

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
251
10

(Monday, February 22, 1993, 3:00 p.m.)
THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Sheila

J. Shipler, CR90-1599.
MR. SCOWCROFT:

Roger Scowcroft for

Miss Shipler, your Honor.
MR. JONES:

Ernie Jones for the State.

THE COURT:

As I understand it, you've

moved to reduce one degree lower; is that accurate?
MR. SCOWCROFT:

Your Honor, I moved,

pursuant to the 1990 version of 76-3-402 that's
controling in this case because that is when the
conduct occurred, under Subsection 2b, to reduce it to
a misdemeanor.

Under the Code, at that time, that

would mean it would render it a class B misdemeanor.
I don't -- you know, if the Court reduced it to an A,
I wouldn't object.

But I think that the law at that

time would mandate that the court, if the person
satisfies the conditions of successful completion
without violation, mandates that it be reduced to a
misdemeanor, which would be a class B misdemeanor.
I had an opportunity to review the
State's memorandum, and I'm prepared to briefly
respond to that.
My position on the motion is, once
11

again, that it is mandatory based upon Miss Shipler9s
conduct in this case; that is, that she completed
probation without violation.

She -- incidentally, she

has no other criminal history, paid restitution in the
amount of about $6,000, completed her probation
without a violation.
of potential.

She's a young person with a lot

And, of course, this, I think, means a

lot to her ability to make a living, get a good job,
other sorts of burdens that a felony conviction
creates for people.
So that's our position on the motion,
your Honor.

I am prepared, I think, to respond to the

State's memorandum, if Mr. Jones would like to present
it to the Court, or however.
THE COURT:

Mr. Jones*

MR. JONES:

Well, Judge, I'm not so

concerned about the memorandum.

As you recall, the

Defendant now cites 76-3-402 as the basis to reduce
this conviction.
As the Court may recall at the time of
sentencing in this case, which was back, I believe, in
November, 1990, he filed a similar motion, an oral
motion to the Court, to reduce this from a second
degree motion (sic) to a third; and the Court granted
that motion.
12
nnn© M

It's our position that Defendant can't
cone in and use Section 402 for a second tine.

In

other words, what he's doing is filing a notion at the
tine of sentencing to reduce it one degree, and now
he's coning back at the conclusion of probation and
trying to invoke the sane statute again.

I don't read

the statute as allowing a defendant two bites at the
apple, to allow then to reduce the conviction once at
sentencing and again at the conclusion of probation.
In fact, as I read the language in the
statute, I think it specifically precludes that.

If

you look at Subsection 3 of the statute -- under
76-3-402, Subsection 3 says:
"An offense nay be reduced only one
degree under this section, unless the prosecutor
specifically agrees in writing or on the court record
that the offense nay be reduced."
And I think that's why the language is
in there.

I don't think the legislature ever intended

a defendant to be able to reduce their conviction
twice, once at sentencing and again.
As you nay recall, frequently at the
tine of sentencing we have this notion nade, and a lot
of tines the court will take the notion under
advisenent until we conclude probation and then grant
13

nnn£5

1

it if there's no further problems.

But in this

2

situation where the Defendant made a motion at the

31 time of sentencing and it was granted, I just don't
4

think you can come in again and cite that same statute

51 and reduce the case for a second time.
6|

So that's the basis for our opposing the

71 motion now to reduce it another degree.
81
9

THE COURT:

Does she have any other

criminal convictions?

10

MR. JONES:

Not that I am of aware of.

11

MR. SCOWCROFT:

121

THE COURT:

13

MR. SCOWCROFT:

14

THE COURT:

What harm is done?

15

MR. JONES:

Well, I just don't think

Can I respond to

—

Just a minute.
Okay.

16

that's what the statute's ever designed for, Judge.

17

just don't think we are

181

—

THE COURT:

I understand.

That is not

MR. JONES:

The harm that it is done is

191 the question.
201
21

the fact that this woman stole six thousand dollars,

22

she's being prosecuted, she entered a guilty plea and

23

we imposed a sentence.

24

THE COURT:

Has she paid it back?

251

MR. JONES:

As far as I know, she has.
14

I

But I don't think it is a question of complying.

It

is a question of how we are interpreting the statute
and what we are doing with the statute.

To me, we are

just totally distroying the purpose for the statute if
we are going to allow defendants two chances to reduce
their convictions.
Certainly, the statute allows for them
to expunge their record, but they've got to wait —

I

think it is -- five years before they come in and do
that.
I just don't think the statute was ever
designed to give them two different chances to reduce
their conviction.
THE COURT:

Do you make motions in the

interest of justice on occasion?
MR. JONES:

Do we make motions in the

interest of justice?

situation.

THE COURT:

Do you on occasion?

MR. JONES:

I think it depends on the

But, that's what Z say -THE COURT:

question.

Do you

I mean, that is the

—

MR. JONES:

I guess Z don't understand

what you are saying.
THE COURT:

Do you, on occasions, make
15

00087

1

motions in the interest of justice?

21

MR. JONES:

You mean like to dismiss a

41

THE COURT:

Sure.

51

MR. JONES:

Yes, in some situations.

61

TEE COURT:

Or to reduce, or whatever?

71

MR. JONES:

Yes.

3

case?

81 as applying to this situation.
9

But I don't see that
I mean, we've got a

statute that specifically provides for reduction of

101 convictions.

And it just seems to me she's already

111 made that motion at the time of sentencing.
12

MR. SCOWCROFT:

Can I respond?

13

First of all, the 1990 statute that

141 applies in this case does not contain the language
151 cited by Mr. Jones including a two-step reduction.
16

The statute was amended in '91, and that language was

17

inserted then.

18
19

And, Mr. Jones, the 1990 statute, does
not contain that language.

20
21

The version I have given to you.

THE COURT:

Does it use the language,

"Imposition"?

22

MR. SCOWCROFT:

It says, quote, under

231 Subsection 2:
24
25

"Whenever a conviction is for a felony,
the conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor
16

if"

—
And then Subsection a says:
"Designates the sentence to be a

misdemeanor, which was the purpose of the motion

—

the written motion we filed at sentencing."
But under Subsection b, a different
statute, it says:
"If the imposition of the sentence is
stayed and the defendant is placed on probation,
whether committed to jail or as a condition of
probation or not, and he is thereafter discharged
without violating his probation"
THE COURT:

—

Isn't that the subsection

that we are dealing with?
MR. SCOWCROFT:

That is.

And that is a

different section from that utilized by the Court to
sentence Miss Shipler to a third degree felony after
she pled guilty to a second degree felony*
The Court could have sentenced her to a
Class A misdemeanor under the 1990 version of the Code
at the time of sentencing, which was the purpose of
the motion that we made.
at that time*
time.

That's what we were seeking

The Court could have done it at that

The Court could have taken it under advisement,

and done it now.

But there's no statute precluding a
17

00089

1

further reduction.

And my reading of the statute is,

2

in fact, that it's mandatory.

But I think this is a

31 person who, in the interest of justice, deserves it,
41 if anyone does.
51

THE COURT:

You cause me to be more

61 reflective about reducing at the time of sentencing.
71

MR. JONES:

My understanding was that

81 she didn't file this motion for this reduction until
9

October/November of 1991.

10

just cited was in effect.

And this statute that I

Ill

MR. SCOWCROFT:

12

MR. JONES:

13

take the best of both worlds, and say:

14

use the '90 statute in this situation and the '91 in

15

the next situation.19

16

Well, yes.

You are going to be able to

MR. SCOWCROFT:

"We want to

Well, 76-1-103 of the

17

Code, "Application of Code, Offense prior to effective

18

date" —

19

copy, your Honor -- does say that:

20

got a copy of that, and I've given you a

"Offenses.

Sentencing of offenses is

21

governed by the law in effect at the time of the

22

offense."

23

And I've got the Code section here*

And

24

I'll just give you a copy. Judge, if you want to take

25

a look at that.
18

nnnoft

II
2

M y r e a d i n g is t h a t t h e 1 9 9 0 s t a t u t e
applies because the offense occurred in 1990.

3

THE COURT;

1 4 1 deny the motion.

41

MR. SCOWCROFT:

Would the Court issue

51 written findings?
61

TEE COURT:

71 statute.

I'm just construing the

I executed on the sentence.

I didn't

8] suspend the imposition of the sentence.
9

MR. SCOWCROFT:

Well, let me —

101 State didn't argue that, Judge.
111 make that argument.

They seemed not to

That's in the memorandum.

12

c a n briefly address that issue?

13

arguing

If I

T h e S t a t e s e e m s to b e

—

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SCOWCROFT:

16

issue findings?

17

think.

18

the

I read t h e i r
Okay.

brief.

Would the Court

Because w e need written f i n d i n g s , I

THE COURT:

N o , I am j u s t a p p l y i n g t h e

19

statute.

I'm making no findings.

I guess you can

20

make a finding that I did execute on the sentence.

21

didn't suspend imposition of the sentence.

I

I

221 concluded that Subsection b appliesi and, accordingly,
23

it's not applicable and denied the relief.

24

MR. SCOWCROFT:

All right.

251 written findings to pursue this.
19

I need

And I just ask that

the Court have them -THE COURT:

The only finding that I'm

aware of is that basically that that's the section
under which you move.

My order earlier was an

execution of the sentence, not a suspension of
imposition of sentence.
MR. SCOWCROFT:
Judge —

The problem with that

and I don't mean to argue with you, and I

won't take up your time.

But that argument would

require that a sentence never even be imposed.

If

there's a difference between suspending and staying,
you'd never ask to reduce a conviction if it were
never entered.
THE COURT:

As frivolous as it was, I

bought it.
MR. SCOWCROFT:

All right.

Well, I

think -- I would request that the State prepare
findings.

I will need written findings, your Honor.
THE COURT:

I guess if you want

findings, I am not going —

I told you the extent to

which I will find, and that's all.

If you want to

just briefly state that and submit it to Mr. Jones
before it comes over -MR. SCOWCROFT:

Okay.

And so the

Court's finding, just so I am clear on this, is
20
r\ r\ r\/*o

1

that...

21

THE COURT:

I executed sentence.

I did

31 not suspend imposition of sentence.
4
5

MR. SCOWCROFT:
suspend it.

61

Well, the Court did

Now, the statute says "stayed" -THE COURT:

I suspended execution on any

71 confinement.
81

MR. SCOWCROFT:

9

THE COURT:

10

All right.

And placed her on probation

on the following terms and conditions.

11

MR. SCOWCROFT:

12

THE COURT:

And so

—

The only thing I suspended

13

was the execution on any prison sentence.

14

MR. SCOWCROFT:

Okay.

The Court's

15

ruling is that because the imposition of sentence was

16

not stayed, is that correct, that the subsection does

17

not apply?

18

THE COURT:

Right.

19

MR. SCOWCROFT:

I'll prepare findings,

201 then, and submit them to the Court.
21

THE COURT:

I think that's what

22

Mr. Jones said in his brief.

23

And that is the basis of my ruling.

24
251

MR. SCOWCROFT:

That's why*

I read it.

Thank you very much.

(Hearing adjourned.)
21
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ADDENDUM E

Third Judicial District

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: 532-5444

MAR 0 9 1993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTI^T
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

v.

:

SHEILA SHIPLER,

:

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Case No. 901901599FS
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

:

The defendant's Motion to Reduce Conviction to Misdemeanor
came before this Court for hearing on February 22, 1993, at the hour
of 2:00 p.m.

The defendant was represented by her attorney,

Roger K. Scowcroft, and plaintiff State of Utah was represented by
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Ernest W. Jones. Having heard the
arguments of the parties, the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on October 22, 1990, the defendant entered a plea

of "guilty" to the charge of Theft, a second-degree felony;
2.

That on November 19, 1990, the defendant was sentenced

as a third-degree felony, pursuant to the provisions of
§76-3-402(1), Utah Code Ann. (1990), to serve, inter alia, the
statutory term of zero-to-five years incarceration at the Utah State
Prison;

00058

3.

That on November 19, 1990, the Court suspended the

imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on probation; and
4.

That on October 17, 1991, the Court terminated the

defendant's probation as successful without violation.
WHEREFORE, having made these Findings of Fact, the Court
now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
1.

The defendant's Motion to Reduce Conviction to

Misdemeanor is hereby denied on the grounds that §76-3-402(2)(b),
Utah Code Ann. (1990), does not authorize reducing defendant's
conviction to a misdemeanor because the imposed sentence was
executed by the Court.
~*W\

DATED this

day of March, 1993.

BY THE yCOURT:

HONORABLE KENN
Third District Cou:

Approved as to Fo:

^

ERNEST W. JON!
Deputy Salt ^ake County Attorney
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this
: i SV
_^

day of March, 1993,

C^*$-

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 901901599FS
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

SHEILA SHIPLER,
Defendant.

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
previously made and entered by this Court, the defendant's Motion to
Reduce Conviction to Misdemeanor is HEREBY DENIED.

DATED this

°]

day of March, 1993.
BY THE (COURT:

HONORABLE KENNETH/RIGTflUP
Third District Cot

Approved as to Form:

/irft*ERNEST W. JONI
Deputy Salt L^ke County Attorney
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

/

day of March, 1993.
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